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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT VENTURE CAPITAL: 
 





As most other countries, Germany also faces dramatic regional differences in terms of socio-
economic development. One important driver of such development is the existence of a 
healthy entrepreneurial activity and the creation of new companies. We argue that venture 
capital (VC) and especially community development venture capital (CDVC) can be a 
powerful instrument to stimulate entrepreneurship and to support the growth of ambitious 
companies. Hence, the present paper deals with the general questions, whether there are 
regional gaps in the supply of VC in Germany? Whether these regional gaps do 
geographically correspond to the most deprived areas in Germany, and which kind of VC 
companies are currently in place in order to close potential regional gaps? Geographically, we 
find that the north-eastern part of Germany is far more deprived than the rest of the country, 
but is relatively well supplied with VC. Nevertheless, the primary potential target area for 
CDVC activities in the country is the federal state of Brandenburg in this area. Our 
assessment of German players in the VC market reveals that some public VC companies do 
investments similar to CDVC. However, these companies do not offer real hands-on support 
for entrepreneurs, and real CDVC engagement in the country is yet to come. 
 
JEL classification:  G24; O16 
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1.  Introduction 
Economies around the globe experience asymmetric levels of economic and social 
development within their boundaries. Similarly, some areas in Germany are seriously less 
developed than others. Apparently, it is a central goal of economic policy to help 
underdeveloped areas to overcome their problems. Since there are many possible reasons for 
these disparities, politicians and researchers face the difficult task to find efficient and 
sustainable levers to foster economic development in affected regions (Armstrong and Taylor, 
2000).  
According to one line of reasoning, the supply of appropriate capital can help to nurture 
regional entrepreneurial activity (Harding, 2000). Consequently, the provision of venture 
capital to entrepreneurial individuals or enterprises could have a positive impact on the level 
of development through an increased number of successful start-ups and innovations (Murray, 
1998). If venture capital is not only invested to yield financial returns, but also purposely to 
realize social benefits, e.g. economic development of a defined region, it is called community 
development venture capital (Achleitner, 2008). In a German context, there is hardly any 
literature addressing this special aspect of venture capital.  Thus, the present paper aims at 
introducing this concept as a tool for policy-makers on the one hand and a potential business 
model for venture capital managers on the other. Further, it is an exploratory attempt to sketch 
the status quo concerning community development venture capital in Germany.  
We start by outlining the current situation of economic and social development in Germany 
based on a comprehensive ranking recently conducted for the entire country on the level of its 
439 districts in chapter 2. Then, it is argued in chapter 3 that regional levels of economic 
development and deprivation might correlate with the regional availability of appropriate 
venture capital. This leads us to chapter 4 and the concept of community development venture 
capital that unifies the pursuit of financial and social goals simultaneously, thereby 
representing an interesting point of departure for attempts to foster economic development. 
Subsequently, in chapter 5 the German venture capital market is briefly characterized and 
community development venture capital-relevant particularities as well as market players are 
extracted. It is then argued in chapter 6 that this concept can best unfold its impact in regions 
that are not well supplied with venture capital. Therefore, potential regional venture capital 
deficiencies in Germany are identified by location quotients of regional venture capital  
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activity and demand. These are calculated on the level of federal states, the most granular unit 
of analysis for which data is currently available. Findings on possible regional equity gaps and 
deprived regions are then presented in chapter 7 that passes into a conclusion and a brief 
discussion of implications as well as possible future research in chapters 8 and 9 respectively.  
 
2.  Regional Disparities in Germany 
Even well developed economies like Germany exhibit significant disparities in regional 
development. Recently, an empirical investigation of the regions’ ability to cope with future 
economic challenges called “Zukunftsatlas 2007” has revealed strong regional disparities 
concerning the level of prosperity and economic power in Germany (Prognos AG, 2007). In 
the following paragraphs the nation’s current socio-economic situation is outlined on the level 
of its federal states. This analysis will also serve as fundament for the identification of 
possible target areas for CDVC in Germany later on.  
To start with, Germany comprises 16 federal states (“Länder”), which are, again, built up by a 
total of 439 districts (“Kreise”) and independent cities (“kreisfreie Städte”).
1 The study of 
regional development we will refer to, the “Zukunftsatlas 2007”, ranked all these 439 German 
districts according to 29 macro- and socio-economic indicators in the dimension of 
demography, prosperity and social aspects, labor market, as well as competition and 
innovation (Prognos AG, 2007). We have used the Zukunftsatlas as an indicator because of 
several reasons: to our knowledge, there is no universally accepted indicator for socio-
economic deprivation in Germany. Particularly problematic is the fact that such a construct is 
usually made up by several dimensions. Putting an emphasis on one of these dimensions 
results in a different picture of regional development. Hence, we intentionally chose the 
Zukunftsatlas as a general indicator.  
The present study analyzes CDVC on the level of federal states. Since the size of the states, 
and for this reason also the number of districts in each state, significantly differs, our general 
assessment of regional deprivation is based on a relative indicator – each state’s share of 
                                                 
1 According to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) issued by the European Union, 
federal states are NUTS 1 level regions, while districts and independent cities belong to the NUTS 3 category.   
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districts in the nation’s bottom quartile in the Zukunftsatlas 2007 ranking.
2 For evaluating 
regional development, districts’ rankings in this study were taken as proxies for relative 
regional development instead of index points, which have no explanatory power per se. 
Implicitly, this underlines the relative nature of regional development or deprivation in a 
national context. However, this proceeding leads to another question: which relative position 
in such a national ranking signals a state of underdevelopment? We solved this problem by 
assuming that the last quartile of regions in this regional ranking can be regarded as relatively 
backward.
3  
More precisely, in order to determine each federal state’s level of socio-economic deprivation, 
we have first calculated the percentage of districts in each state falling into the nation’s 
quartile of most deprived districts according to the ranking of the Zukunftsatlas 2007 (see 
table in figure 1). For example, 83.3% of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania’s districts belong 
to the 25% most deprived districts in Germany. Secondly, in order to obtain a better sense of 
the socio-economic level of deprivation, we have averaged a state’s districts rankings in the 
Zukunftsatlas 2007 (see table in figure 1). The higher the arithmetic mean, the more deprived 
is a state. Correspondingly, the indication in parenthesis specifies the state’s relative national 
ranking on this basis. According to this indication, the most deprived state of the 16 German 
Länder is Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania in the north-east with an average ranking of its 
districts among the nation’s total 439 of 373.  
Being interested in the country’s socio-economically most deprived states; we further marked 
the nation’s most deprived states in figure 1. As a first step, it makes sense to divide between 
the western and the north-eastern part of the country.
4 The federal states belonging to the 
latter region are marked in the table on the left side as well as the map on the right side of 
figure 1.  
 
--- Insert figure 1 here --- 
                                                 
2 Such a relative measure of regional deprivation is also used in a study of the British Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister (2004) for assessing England. 
3  Alternative thresholds have been tried but do not deliver any significantly different picture.   
4  Exceptions are the federal states of Saarland and Berlin.   
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Figure 1 points out that the nation’s currently socio-economically most deprived and 
backward part is its north-east. It is this region comprising Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 
Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, Saxony, and Brandenburg that is far more deprived than the rest of 
the country.  All these states have an average ranking of their districts in the bottom quartile 
(≥331) and /or at least two third (≥66.7%) of their districts belong to the least developed 25% 
in the country. In fact, this result is barely surprising considering this area is exactly congruent 
with the territory of the former socialist German Democratic Republic, whose existence came 
to an end in 1990 with the German reunification. In the present work we will refer to these 
states as the “new Länder”.
5 These states still lag behind the economic development and level 
of prosperity compared to those of the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The 
federal states within this western area are here named “old Länder”. In this latter region, only 
the two states of Bremen and Saarland are facing problems in terms of low average positions. 
Least deprived in terms of low percentage of districts in the bottom quartile of the 
Zukunftsranking and relatively low average ranking are Hamburg, Baden-Württemberg, and 
Bavaria.  
The potential reasons for these differences are manifold and reach from demographic issues, 
various historical backgrounds to differences in the industrial structure (Armstrong and 
Taylor, 2000). It is often argued that entrepreneurial activity can play a significant role in 
causing economic growth and job creation (e.g. Fritsch and Müller, 2006). Entrepreneurs are 
responsible for changes in economic structures and, thus, are very important engines of 
economic growth (Baron, 1998; Hayek, 1945; Timmons, 1990). Such changes through 
innovation and start-ups induce a variety of consequences, which are controversially 
discussed, but are usually said to be positive for public welfare (Fritsch, 2007; Koch, 2001). 
First and foremost they cause market selection processes in an economic system that are said 
to have a (mainly indirect) positive impact on employment (Acs and Armington, 2004; 
Fritsch, 2007; Fritsch and Weyh, 2004). Hence, the competitiveness of economic systems and 
enterprises is heavily dependent on the ability to produce innovations and nourish start-ups 
(Cantner et al., 2003; Drewello and Wurzel, 2002).  
                                                 
5  Please note that Berlin is terminologically treated as one of the new Länder due to its geographical location in 
the east of the country. However, West Berlin has been part of the Federal Republic of Germany.  
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3.  Venture Capital as Driver of Regional Development 
In order to create a venture or introduce an innovation, young as well as small and medium 
enterprises face many challenges. One of the most important issues is to get access to 
appropriate forms of financing (Harding, 2000). The supply of appropriate capital for 
realizing new ideas is often a bottleneck for companies (Engel, 2003). Potentials and inherent 
risks of innovations and new ideas can hardly be evaluated and rated. Therefore, in many 
cases financiers are only willing to invest on extremely restrictive conditions or simply refuse 
to inject capital into such projects (Dahlstrand and Cetindamar, 2000). In addition, the 
minimum investment volume required by investors is increasing, which results in financing 
problems for smaller projects. The reasons are relatively fixed costs of investment such as 
conducting a due diligence and structuring a deal. This leads to higher expected returns for 
larger investments (Harding, 2000), and results in an undersupply of money for small 
entrepreneurial ventures.  
Given that – as stated before – these economic agents and enterprises are drivers of growth 
and employment, this situation does not represent an overall optimum and could be 
interpreted, from a public perspective, as a partial market failure (Möckel, 2005). 
Consequently, providing start-ups and innovative companies with access to adequate financial 
resources is a central element of economic policy (Da Rin et al., 2005; European Commission, 
2003; OECD, 2001). It is argued that an efficient and flexible supply of money for innovation 
and start-ups can be an important tool for the development of sectors and regions (Murray, 
1998). The underlying assumption is that by providing needed capital to small business 
owners, new enterprises can be created, more jobs generated, and a stronger economic base 
for local residents can be built (Jegen, 1998). 
Due to the given imponderability for financiers investing in innovation and start-ups, equity is 
the most important, and sometimes the only available, source of finance. Equity or near equity 
capital, such as convertible loans or warrants, that is provided to young, small or growing 
businesses is called venture capital (VC) (Benjamin et al., 2004). Accordingly, VC companies 
make long-term investments in private enterprises in return for an equity stake (Harding, 
2000). In the present work the term of VC refers to money invested in enterprises in early or  
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expansion stage. Following the definition of the German Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association (BVK) early stage consists of seed and start-up financing (BVK, 2007c).
6 
Following the argumentation given above, large amounts of public money were poured into 
VC and similar forms, indicating the conviction that VC can promote economic growth and 
create jobs (Jeng and Wells, 2000). Among these efforts, some public institutions have 
explicitly tried to respond to the above mentioned undersupply of risk capital in order to 
overcome regional disparities (Murray, 1998). Certain regions seem to have severe problems 
to attract sufficient VC. VC companies as well as their investments are highly concentrated in 
some regions (Fritsch and Schilder, 2006a, 2006b; Martin et al., 2005).  
Different possible reasons can be found to explain this. However, the central argument that is 
brought up here is that spatial proximity between the VC company and the portfolio company 
is assumed to be highly important. Many VC companies have strong regional networks that 
generate a regional deal flow and ease the execution of due diligence. These processes are 
facilitated through face-to-face contacts as well as exchanging information and know-how 
within small distances. Moreover, after a deal has been closed hands-on support very often 
requires spatial proximity in order to enable a VC company to provide support and to monitor 
actions undertaken by the entrepreneur (Lerner, 1995; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). 
Theoretically, perceived risks as well as transaction, agency and information costs increase 
the further the distance to the portfolio company (Martin et al., 2005). Hence, VC companies’ 
behavior to reduce these costs and risks by investing in targets that are located closely is 
rational.  
This hypothesized importance of spatial proximity has been supported by different 
international empirical studies, arguing that VC companies predominantly invest in nearby 
targets (Powell et al., 2002; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Cumming and Johan, 2006). 
However, in the case of Germany the question of regional VC gaps created by a concentration 
of the VC industry in only few clusters is not completely answered yet. For instance, Fritsch 
and Schilder (2006a, 2006b) investigated the relevance of spatial proximity between VC 
                                                 
6  Replacement, turnaround and bridge will be included in expansion stage later on since our data does not allow 
for a distinction between expansion and these investment stages on a regional basis. However, these stages 
only account for relatively small volumes and numbers in the German market.  
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companies and their portfolio companies. They found no support for regional gaps in the 
supply of VC in Germany. 
However, in the present paper we adopt the position that the concentration of German VC 
companies in only few major cities together with a potential investors’ regional bias could 
result in regional gaps in the supply of VC (see also Martin et al., 2005). According to Martin 
et al., 2005 more than 65% of German VC companies’ head offices have been located in only 
six urban centers.
7 This situation is not likely to have changed considerably in recent years 
and could lead to difficulties in raising VC in some regions like Thuringia, the south of 
Saxony-Anhalt and Saxony as well as the north of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.  
In addition, it can be assumed that the importance of spatial proximity between an investor 
and a portfolio company differs among deals. For instance, it could be argued that companies  
in an earlier phase of development are exposed to a higher risk of failure and need more 
management support by the VC company. This could lead to a higher importance of spatial 
proximity between investor and portfolio company (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Hence, there 
could be some regional VC gaps, which are especially severe for certain VC and portfolio 
companies. 
This, in turn, might inhibit economic development in these areas and finally could be one 
explanation for socio-economic deprivation. A possible measure to mitigate such 
underdevelopment through the supply of appropriate money to entrepreneurs is community 
development venture capital (CDVC). 
 
4.  The Concept of Community Development Venture Capital 
The term “ community development venture capital” (CDVC) refers to the use of VC to 
finance businesses in order to create financial returns for investors as well as social returns 
(Jegen, 1998). In other words, capital in the form of equity and near-equity investments as 
well as a wide range of management support is provided to certain companies with the 
explicit intention to reach some of various possible social goals. Although these social goals 
are elementary for the concept of CDVC, venture capital companies (VCs) need to yield a 
                                                 
7  Munich (37 VCs), Frankfurt (35 VCs), Hamburg (20 VCs), Berlin-Potsdam (20 VCs), Düsseldorf (17 VCs) 
and Hannover (11 VCs).  
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profit to investors in order to stay in business. Consequently, also CDVC companies seek to 
invest in businesses that have great ideas, outstanding management teams, and a strong 
growth potential. Being traditional VC from that perspective also implies that CDVC 
companies offer their portfolio companies active strategic and operational support. Because of 
their hybrid nature, looking for profit and social opportunities, CDVC companies are said to 
pursue a “double bottom line” approach (Rubin, 2001; Tesdell and Rubin, 1998). 
The targeted social returns can be manifold. Many community development venture capital 
companies (CDVCs) intend to create high value jobs, entrepreneurial capability and wealth to 
benefit low-income socio-economic groups and the economies of distressed communities. 
Others support environmentally friendly products, sustainable management practices, or 
minority owned businesses (Jegen, 1998). Apparently, apart from the double bottom line the 
concept of CDVC is quite broad and such companies differ among various dimensions. Some 
of these dimensions are social goals, degree of profit orientation, incorporation as profit or 
non-profit organization, degree of government involvement or focused investment stages, deal 
sizes and industries (Achleitner, 2008). However, this variety should not mislead over the fact 
that CDVC is a relatively young concept. Although some US CDVC companies were already 
initiated in the 1970s, the issue gained momentum as recent as in the 1990s (Rubin, 2001).  
Being a young and innovative concept, CDVC is assigned to so-called non-traditional VC. 
Due to CDVC companies specific approach they differ from traditional suppliers of equity 
capital among certain dimensions: The double bottom line approach usually leads to a lower 
degree of profit orientation and the acceptance of moderate growth rates of their portfolio 
companies if these have the potential to create social benefits like significant job creation 
(Benjamin, et al. 2004). This results in CDVCs operating in different regions than traditional 
VCs, in which only moderate returns are expected to be realised and are therefore ignored by 
traditional investors. In addition, their deal sizes and fund volumes tend to be smaller and 
their portfolio’s industry mix is typically more diversified compared to traditional VCs 
(Rubin, 2001). This leads to major challenges for the CDVC industry, particularly in raising 
capital and reaching scale, in attracting experienced talent, and coping with high costs of 
operation (Tesdell and Rubin, 1998). 
For reasons of manageability, the heterogeneity of what is termed CDVC obliged us to narrow 
down our definition for the present investigation. As described above, regional disparities of  
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economic development still represent a central problem for Germany that should be tackled. 
Hence, within the present work we focus on CDVC companies aiming to promote economic 
development of specific deprived regions. We therefore apply a constricted definition of 
CDVC that only includes the social goal of fighting socio-economic deprivation by fostering 
economic development. This can be done in multiple ways, but is mostly pursued by 
providing capital and support to businesses which are creating new employment opportunities 
and innovations in underdeveloped regions. Hence, the two central features of CDVC 
companies in our understanding are (1) having economic development as a goal and (2) 
operating with a regional focus. 
In Germany, CDVC is still rather unknown and there is hardly any experience or scientific 
literature on the issue, even though the general topic is up-to-date: As has been already 
argued, entrepreneurs and innovation are central success factors of economies because they 
induce growth and create employment. Therefore, they are highly welcome and policy-makers 
have introduced various ways of fostering economic development via this lever. However, a 
core problem for entrepreneurs and innovative companies is obtaining appropriate forms of 
financing. Thus, considerable amounts of public money have been spent to support 
entrepreneurship and innovation through numerous channels. We opine that CDVC can be a 
highly effective and efficient tool in fostering economic development by adding the financial 
perspective, i.e. CDVC companies’ unconditional need to make a profit. From a policy-
maker’s perspective, the concept of CDVC could be a very attractive starting point for 
promoting economic development. CDVC companies do not only invest socially-driven but 
also aim at earning profits. Thus, public money invested into CDVC in order to foster 
economic development with a double-bottom line approach will presumably be spent 
efficiently and sustainable.  
Consequently, in the next part of the present study we will take a look at the status quo and 
potential starting points of CDVC in Germany. We will start by taking a look at the German 
VC market and several market players already pursuing a business model equal or similar to 
CDVC. Then, we address the questions whether there are regional gaps in the supply of VC in 
Germany, and whether these regional gaps geographically correspond to the most deprived 
areas in Germany. 
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5.  The German VC Market and CDVC-relevant Particularities 
Related to its GDP, the German VC market is relatively small compared to other economies 
such as the US or the UK. Eminently early stage VC investments are at the lower end 
compared to these countries (Rammer, 2007; EVCA, 2007). We argue here that the main 
reason can not be found in a deficiency of potential investment objects, that is start-ups and 
growing companies, but in disadvantageous VC conditions. Several studies revealed 
disadvantageous conditions concerning several dimensions like the tax, legal and political 
environment for private equity and venture capital in Germany (Apax Partners, 2007; EVCA, 
2007; Kaserer et al., 2007). Hence, it is not surprising that the German VC market is 
traditionally characterised by a high importance of the public sector. Although their share has 
decreased recently, government institutions as investors in VC funds or as public VC 
companies are still quite influential (EVCA, 2007 and earlier).  
Related to the topic of the present paper, none of the pre-existing classifications describing 
VCs (e.g. Achleitner et al., 2006; Bredeck, 2002; Engel, 2003; Schertler, 2001) differentiates 
sufficiently among CDVC-relevant companies. Therefore, a more detailed classification of 
the German VC market accounting for CDVC-relevant particularities has been developed 
here. Starting point for a screening of the German market was the members list of the BVK 
(BVK, 2007a). In order to identify those members that bear a reference to CDVC, we draw on 
the definition set before: CDVC companies consider (1) economic development as a goal and 
have a (2) regional focus in which they operate. 
As far as our analysis showed, private VC companies in Germany do not seem to invest 
according to the criteria we applied for CDVC. They have no explicit intention to promote 
economic development. However, as indicated before the German VC market has a relatively 
large share of (quasi-)public money. Such money is invested to induce growth and increase 
welfare. Within this (quasi-public) segment, we have identified four types of VC companies 
that are of relevance because they are also likely to have a regional focus: 
To begin with, (1) Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften (MBG) are regional 
development agencies founded by private actors and public banks. Each German federal state 
runs one MBG (only the states of Berlin and the surrounding Brandenburg have a joint one). 
MBGs differ from (2) subsidiaries of institutions promoting economic development in that the  
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latter’s major shareholders are mostly public promotional banks (Förderbanken) or non-profit 
associations. Less influenced by public money but acting similar to public institutions in 
terms of regional development are (3) subsidiaries of savings banks and, infrequently, 
cooperative banks. Their major shareholders are regional savings banks (Sparkassen) or 
cooperative banks (Raiffeisenbanken and Volksbanken). Similarly, we classify (4) 
subsidiaries of state banks and cooperative central institutes, owned by state banks 
(Landesbanken) or central institutes of cooperative banks, in this group of CDVC-relevant 
market players.  
Because of their behavior and shareholder structure the latter two types of VC companies are 
regarded as quasi-public. Many subsidiaries of savings banks do have regional economic 
development as an objective accruing from their regional field of operation, strong regional 
links and a long term business relationship orientation of their mother institutions. This 
behavior also applies to subsidiaries of state banks and cooperative central institutes since 
savings banks, public institutions as well as local cooperative banks, which only operate 
within a certain region, are major shareholders of the VCs’ mother institutions. However, a 
transition to a stronger concentration on financial returns can be acknowledged within the 
latter group. 
Since investment volumes and number of portfolio companies are not available for individual 
German VC companies, market shares cannot easily be calculated. However, a first 
impression of the importance of this group of (quasi-)public VC companies featuring some 
CDVC characteristics can be obtained by considering their number in relation to the number 
of members in the BVK. In June 2007 the association had 185 members altogether, of which 
the four types of institutions mentioned above represent 31% (57 members).
8 
All these companies meet our first criteria – fostering economic development – to some extent 
but it has not been accounted for our second criteria yet. In order to check whether they have a 
regional focus, we reviewed the companies’ regional preferences as shown in the BVK 
website (BVK, 2007b). A VC company was considered to have a regional focus if it limits its 
                                                 
8  The subgroups within this group of 57 (31%) are: 15 MBGs (8% of overall total), 9 subsidiaries of institutions 
promoting economic development (5%), 16 subsidiaries of savings banks (9%), and 16 subsidiaries of state 
banks and cooperative central institutes (9%). The High-Tech Gründerfonds is not considered here since it 
does not fall into one of the named categories.  
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operations to a specific area within Germany. This lavish procedure revealed that 39 of these 
57 VC companies do have an explicit regional focus in doing their business.
9 This leads to a 
final share of CDVC-relevant VC companies in Germany by number of 21%, concerning both 
criteria.  
To further characterize the potentially CDVC-relevant types of VC companies identified 
above an existing dataset from a previous study conducted for the KfW-Bankengruppe was 
reanalyzed (Achleitner et al., 2006). In the course of this study 177 VC companies, which are 
members of the BVK, have been asked to complete a questionnaire concerning their 
characteristics and investment preferences in September 2005. Due to the support of the BVK 
a very high response rate of 47% has been achieved. 
However, for the purpose of the present paper this available data on general VC investments 
in Germany was filtered, rearranged, and regrouped in order to identify relevant market 
segments that can be characterized as CDVC. This allowed for analyzing VC companies 
assigned to this segment among several dimensions. These dimensions are their respective 
stage focus, used financial instruments, extend of hands-on management, investments per 
investment professional, as well as specific investment requirements (see figure 2).  
 
--- Insert figure 2 here --- 
 
The focus of the different (quasi-)public VC companies on the investment stage shows a 
heterogeneous picture.
10 The study suggests that the majority of MBGs clearly focuses on 
later stage deals while subsidiaries of institutions promoting economic development are either 
specialized on early stage investments or do not have any obvious preference. The majority of 
subsidiaries of savings banks focuses on later stage deals or does not show any preference. 
                                                 
9  All of the MBGs and the subsidiaries of institutions promoting economic development, 13 of the 16 (81%) 
subsidiaries of savings banks but only 2 of the 16 (13% ) subsidiaries of state banks and cooperative central 
institutes have a regional focus. 
10 A VC company was said to have an early stage focus if more than 70% of their 2002-2004 investment volume 
were seed and start-up transactions. Analogical a VC company was said to have a later stage focus if more 
than 70% of their 2002-2004 investment volume were expansion, buyouts, public-to-private, or pipe 
transactions.  
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There are only few VCs in this group focusing on early stage deals. The majority of 
subsidiaries of state banks and cooperative central institutes has no stage focus, while the 
remaining share specializes on later stage deals.  
VC companies participating in the survey reported to use a wide range of financial 
instruments. In general MBGs and subsidiaries of savings banks predominantly invest in the 
form of silent partnerships whereas subsidiaries of savings banks also frequently invest 
directly. Subsidiaries of institutions promoting economic development as well as subsidiaries 
of state banks and cooperative central institutes seem to prefer direct investments, but also use 
silent investments and other mezzanine instruments.  
In order to investigate the extent and frequency of management support provided by the 
specific type of investor the VC companies have been asked which share of their portfolio 
companies are managed hands-on. In addition, the average number of investments per 
investment professional has been calculated. It turns out that MBGs usually do not offer any 
hands-on support and investment professionals are in charge for considerably more 
investments (5.83) compared to private VC companies (0.40). Even though investment 
professionals working for subsidiaries of institutions promoting economic development have 
to take care of more investments than private VCs, they report a comparable frequency of 
hands-on management. Subsidiaries of savings banks as well as subsidiaries of state banks 
and cooperative central institutes report only few or moderate hands-on frequencies while the 
latter have relatively large human resources available for their investments.  
Most VCs state certain investment requirements in regard to investment volume, revenue of 
the potential portfolio company or estimated gross return. Comparing (quasi-)public VC 
companies to private VC companies it turns out that the former have significantly lower 
investment requirements. Only subsidiaries of state banks and cooperative central institutes 
exhibit investment requirements with regard to volume and revenue of the potential portfolio 
company comparable or even higher than private VCs.  
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Location quotient (LQ)= 
Regional share of national VC investments
Regional share of proxy for VC demand
Location quotient (LQ)= 
Regional share of national VC investments
Regional share of proxy for VC demand
6.  Indications for Possible Regional Equity Gaps in Germany 
If in any region demand for VC exceeds available supply, an equity gap prevails. In order to 
identify possible regional equity gaps in Germany several location quotients have been 
calculated. Location quotients are a statistical device deployed to detect concentrations and 
deficiencies of VC investments across regions and have been already applied in several 
studies. For instance, Martin et al. (2005) analyze several location quotients, which map the 
region’s share of VC investments compared to macroeconomic variables. These indicators 
represent proxies for investigating demand and supply of VC in a given region (e.g. Jeng and 
Wells, 2000; Gompers et al., 1998). 
A region’s location quotient is calculated by dividing the regional share of the national VC 
investments by the regional share of a proxy for VC demand. A quotient larger than unity 
signals that, on a national level, a larger share of VC is invested in this region than expected. 
This means that a concentration of VC investments can be found in this region. In turn, a 
quotient smaller than unity indicates less VC investments than expected based on the region’s 
national share of the proxy for VC demand – i.e. a potential deficiency could prevail. 
 
 
Main advantages of this methodology are its easy use and the relatively low data 
requirements; therefore, being a suitable method for an exploratory investigation as the 
present. Regional VC investments can be measured either by numbers of VC financed 
companies or by volume of money invested. As proxies for regional VC demand could serve 
different macroeconomic indicators, such as GDP, size of firm stock, or number of start-ups 
(Martin et al., 2005).  
For our analysis the volume and number of regional VC investments in the period from 2004 
to 2006 as reported by the BVK are taken as proxies for actual VC activity (BVK, 2007c). 
Since BVK data on VC investments is only available on the level of federal states, these are 
chosen as units of analysis. As proxy for demand in terms of volume we refer to regional 
share of GDP. In terms of number we differentiated between early stage on the one hand and 
expansion stage as well as total VC on the other. In the former case it is assumed that the  
   18
regional share of the nation’s overall start-ups can serve as best proxy easily accessible, while 
for expansion stage and total VC it is drawn on the regional share of the nation’s overall firm 
stock. 
 
7.  Findings 
For analyzing the actual VC investments in relation to the potential regional VC demand, LQs 
were computed for each federal state. Additionally early stage, expansion stage, and their total 
have been investigated separately. Further, for each of these three categories per state we 
provide a LQ based on (a) regional share of VC investments in terms of volume in relation to 
regional share of GDP as well as (b) regional share of VC financed companies in relation to 
regional share of start-ups in the early stage category and firm stock in the two remaining 
categories.
11 The six location quotients we have calculated for each federal state are shown in 
figure 3. 
 
--- Insert figure 3 here --- 
 
We marked all LQs that indicate a significant regional gap. As threshold we have drawn on a 
LQ of 0.67, which means the actual regional VC investments only cover two third of the 
expected VC demand derived from the respective proxy. Due to the exploratory nature of the 
present paper, the theoretically more intuitive threshold of unity has not been chosen. Reason 
is that only rough proxies for VC demand can be included, meaning that an inaccuracy in 
identifying possible gaps can only be avoided by increasing the deficit of VC supply that is 
regarded as definitely signaling a deficiency. Furthermore the present paper has the intention 
to concentrate on the most severe potential deficiencies. 
At first glance, looking for an undersupply of VC, i.e. low LQs across early and expansion 
stage, four Bundesländer ought to be highlighted: Brandenburg, Hesse, and – to a certain 
                                                 
11 In the course of our analysis also other LQs with other proxies for VC demand, like population for example, 
have been calculated as a check for plausibility. Since results and implications do only change slightly they are 
not reported here.  
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extent – Bremen and North Rhine-Westphalia. To start with, Brandenburg seems to face the 
most dramatic deficiency in the supply of equity, having LQs significantly lower than 0.67 
across both stages in terms of number and volume. The other state with a general deficiency 
in the supply of VC is Hesse, which lies in the old Länder. The state shows low regional VC 
investments across all stages, with the exception that the LQ based on volume in expansion 
stage of 0.79 exceeds the critical mark. Next to these states, Bremen should also be mentioned 
in this group of states undersupplied with VC, as regional VC investments are low across all 
stages, with only a relatively high share of expansion stage investments by volume. A similar 
situation is indicated in North Rhine-Westphalia, which also shows a palpable deficiency if 
the judgment is based on numbers solely. 
Remarkably, Brandenburg seems to be the only state in the new Länder being short of VC. 
Quite the contrary, for example Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania – after all coming in last in 
the ranking of deprivation – receives far more VC than its GDP and firm stock suggest. The 
LQs of 1.65 in numbers and even 2.80 in volume clearly show a larger VC activity than 
expected. Similar arguments apply to Thuringia and Saxony-Anhalt. 
Examining early stage investments independently, it can be seen that no other state joins the 
group of the four mentioned so far (Brandenburg, Hesse, Bremen, and North Rhine-
Westphalia). Only these have lower LQs than 0.67 in terms of volume and number. 
Particularly, Hesse and Bremen in the old Länder exhibit a significantly lower level of VC 
investments as might have been expected on basis of supply proxies; again, Brandenburg is 
their counterpart in the new Länder. The results for Berlin, Thuringia, and Saxony-Anhalt 
draw specific attention since the VC investments in these states are about double as they 
should be according to our proxies of demand. In particular, Berlin in terms of volume shows 
the highest of all computed LQs with 3.48. 
Contemplating expansion stage exclusively, deficiencies are clearly indicated for Berlin and 
Brandenburg in the new Länder, showing LQs lower than 0.67 for volume and number. In 
turn, Thuringia and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania have extremely high LQs, meaning 
there is a lot more VC in these areas than had been anticipated. In the old Länder, the situation 
is not as clear: none of the states has a potential deficiency according to volume and number. 
For instance, Bremen seems to have only few firms in expansion stage to be financed with  
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VC, exhibiting a deficiency (LQ of 0.55), but the amount of money invested results in a LQ of 
1.13 in terms of volume.  
Bringing the two perspectives of socio-economic deprivation and regional VC activity 
together leads us to a quite simple picture. Mainly the new Länder are deprived. Only 
Brandenburg shows a specifically low level of VC investments and it is this state, which 
seems to be the primary target area (on the level of federal states) for CDVC investments in 
Germany.  
 
8.  Conclusion 
Summing up our analysis of central players within the German CDVC market, existing public 
and quasi-public market players are of high relevance in the CDVC context. Most of these 
institutions show some degree of profit orientation, pursue the goal of promoting economic 
development and operate with a regional focus. As Figure 2 shows most of them do not offer 
hands-on support and instead rather passively provide capital to targets. Furthermore the 
definition of their regional focus is highly influenced by political decisions and territories 
rather than the need for economic development. 
The situation of potential regional equity gaps in Germany varies depending on the proxy 
used (VC volume or number of VC financed companies) and the stage considered (early, 
expansion). It had been expected that the north-east of the country (new Länder) is not only 
more deprived but also clearly disadvantaged concerning VC activity compared to the rest of 
the country. However, the situation regarding VC investments in the new Länder is not as bad 
as had been expected. In fact, there is no clear north-east/south-west- or new Länder/old 
Länder-gap. We expect the large amounts of VC in the new Länder to be mainly of public 
nature. For many years now, the states in the former GDR have been a destination of 
governmental initiatives to foster economic development by providing public money. This 
strong public commitment has obviously already led to a relatively high share of VC 
investments in this area.  
At this point, critics may argue that the supply of sufficient VC might not have induced 
enough momentum to successfully fight socio-economic deprivation in the new Länder. From 
our point of view two arguments can be objected here: First, the degree of economic and  
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social shortfall in the area of the former GDR has already been reduced. The public 
infrastructure for promoting entrepreneurship and the supply of public VC has surely made its 
contribution to this positive trend. Second, and more important in the present context, we 
argue that CDVC is not simply providing equity, but also actively supporting invested 
companies with their expertise, networks, and, last but not least, their own intrinsic motivation 
to be successful. Such motivation is a prerequisite for effectiveness and efficiency. In fact, our 
analysis of relevant market players’ key characteristics shows that such hands-on support of 
entrepreneurs by (quasi-)public VCs can be only found to a limited extent. This result is also 
supported by another empirical study conducted by Schilder, 2006. This central advantage of 
VC financing – management support for entrepreneurs – is hardly available from public 
institutions.  
In addition, the relatively high share of public money in the VC market is already decreasing. 
We expect this trend to continue in times of continuously decreasing public expenditures. 
Therefore, CDVC funds with their financial goals might attract capital from private financiers 
seeking social responsible investments that can replace the decreasing public capital for 
economic development. This has already been recognized by a regional development 
initiative called XperRegio. This initiative recently started a pilot fund offering relatively 
small volumes of mezzanine capital combined with strong management support to companies 
located in certain districts in the eastern part of Bavaria which are in danger of deprivation. 
One of the main purposes of this fund is to replace previously provided capital for regional 
development from the European Union. However, this endeavor does not simply try to find 
other sources of finance, but also to incorporate the insight that private double bottom line 
approaches offer a unique opportunity for efficient and sustainable economic development.  
Assuming that public and especially private CDVC like in this example could be a tool to 
foster economic development, a primary target area must be identified. It should be relatively 
deprived in order to feature a need for development and, to start with, be relatively short of 
VC money. Despite the general finding of the present study that the new Länder are not 
unequivocally the potential target area for possible CDVC measures, the most disadvantaged 
state across all stages is located there: Brandenburg. This state is not only one of the most 
deprived according to the Zukunftsatlas 2007 but also seems to suffer from severe 
undersupply of VC. Hence, according to our exploratory results, the primary target area of  
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initial CDVC investments in Germany would be Brandenburg. In fact, this lack of 
investments in Brandenburg has already been recognized. Hence, the state experienced 
increasing public financial support in recent years (Handelsblatt Nov 26, 2007). However, 
capital is provided in the form of traditional subsidies and subsidized loans. The authors of the 
present paper argue that new instruments like CDVC could offer more efficient and 
sustainable means in order to stimulate economic development. 
Of course, by taking a closer look it becomes visible that CDVC might be a sensible 
instrument in other regions as well: For example, economic development in Bremen might 
benefit from a supply of CDVC in early stage. This federal state does not belong to the most 
deprived quartile of regions according to the Zukunftsatlas 2007, but has a relatively weak 
position with an average ranking of 296 out of 439, particularly in comparison to the other old 
Länder in Germany. According to our line of reasoning, economic development could be 
fostered here by supplying CDVC for individuals and/or enterprises in seed and start-up stage 
of their endeavor. Similar arguments could also be applied to Berlin in expansion stage, or 
even Hesse in general, even though this federal state is currently well developed. 
 
9.  Implications and Future Research 
In other countries such as the USA and UK, CDVC has emerged as a measure to tackle 
regional disparities in terms of deprivation within an economy. It seems that the supply of 
CDVC might be a powerful instrument that is hardly used in Germany so far. Given the fact 
that we were able to identify areas in Germany which suffer from an undersupply of VC and, 
at the same time, from a high level of socio-economic deprivation, attracting CDVC might be 
an alternative or complementary measure to promote regional economic systems.  
To start with, an improved data base, which allows for a differentiation between public and 
private money, could provide important insights. For the case of Germany, we assume a large 
portion of VC in the new Länder to be of public origin. CDVC-relevant regional equity gaps 
can not be identified until such information is available. In addition to this aspect, more 
detailed information on the geographic distribution of VC supply would allow entering the 
level of more realistic geographical units, such as metropolitan areas or districts, and carrying 
out more refined analysis. Equity gaps could be identified in the dimensions of volume, stage,  
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or even industry, presumably allowing a better judgment of potential needs for CDVC and, if 
that is the case, providing policy-makers with a superior basis for decision-making. In other 
words, it would be possible to deal scientifically with CDVC on the level where it should be 
located, communities. 
Moreover, we think future efforts should explicitly target the question, to what extent public 
VC companies already offer real CDVC. By qualitatively assessing public VC companies’ 
business models against the background of the CDVC concept, it should be possible to reveal 
whether only money is supplied or entrepreneurs and companies are actively supported. 
Furthermore, it should be investigated in more detail whether the definition of the regional 
focus is mainly driven by political interests or the need for economic development due to a 
relative regional deprivation. 
In summary, this paper represents a first exploratory step in assessing the mechanisms of 
CDVC and its potential role in regional economic development in Germany. Future research 
should challenge these findings presented here. Econometric models could help to unleash 
relationships between CDVC investments in connection with a certain entrepreneurial 
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Bavaria 96 5 5.2% 138 (3)
North Rhine-Westphalia 54 2 3.7% 193 (5)
Baden-Wuerttemberg 44 2 4.5% 130 (2)
Hesse 26 4 15.4% 174 (4)
Lower Saxony 46 8 17.4% 220 (8)
Hamburg 1 0 0.0% 17 (1)
Rhineland-Palatinate 36 3 8.3% 195 (6)
Schleswig-Holstein 15 0 0.0% 216 (7)
Bremen 2 1 50.0% 296 (10)
Saarland 6 0 0.0% 301 (11)
Berlin 1 0 0.0% 245 (9)
Thuringia 23 19 82.6% 352 (14) x
Saxony 29 19 65.5% 344 (13) x
Saxony-Anhalt 24 19 79.2% 369 (15) x
Mecklenburg-Western P. 18 15 83.3% 373 (16) x
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Figure 1: Germany's economic development on the level of federal states (Zukunftsatlas 2007, 
own illustration).  




1 Pred. = predominantly 
2 Average investments per investment prof. of private VC comp.: 0.40 
 
Figure 2: Important characteristics of CDVC-relevant VC companies (based on data of 










Subs. of state banks 
and coop. central 
institutes
Dimension 
Stage focus  • Later stage  • Early stage 
• No specialisation 
• Later stage 
• No specialisation 
• No specialisation 
Regional focus  • Most  (Länder level)  • Most (Länder level)  • Most (regional level)  • Few (Länder level) 
Double bottom 
line
  • yes  • yes  • partly  • partly 
Hands-on 
management  • Usually no hands-on 
management 
• Frequent hands-on 
management 
• Few hands-on 
management 






• Considerably more 
than private VCs 
(av.: 5.83) 
• More than private VCs 
(av.:0.77) 
• More than private VCs 
(av.: 0.93) 
• Less than private VCs 
(av.: 0.23) 
Financial 
instruments  • Pred.
1 silent 
partnerships 
• Pred. direct invest-
ments, frequent silent 
partnerships
• Pred. silent partner-
ships, frequent direct 
investments
• Pred. direct invest-
ments, frequent 
mezzanine financings
  • Pred. <0.15m€,  
rest 0.15 - 0.75m€ 
• Pred. 0.15 - 0.75m€, 
rest <0.15m€ 
• Pred. 0.15 - 0.75m€, 
rest <0.15m€ 
• Pred. 0.75 - 5m€ 
rest 0.15 - 0.75m€ 
Vol. 
Rev. 
• < 12%  • 8 - 28% • 12 - 28% • 8 - 28% 
• Pred. none, rest 
1.5 - 5 m€ 
• None  • Pred. none and 
0 - 1.5m€ 
• 0 - 1.5 and 5 - 50m€ 
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Figure 3: Location Quotients – Share of Volume-Number of BVK Investments (2004-06) / Share of Indicator (2006) (based on data of Zukunftsatlas 
2007; BVK, 2007). 
      Development (Zukunftsatlas 2007)  Location Quotients of VC investments 
      Early  Expansion  Total VC 
      Volume  Number  Volume  Number  Volume  Number 





districts in most 
deprived 25%
Majority of 
districts is most 
deprived 25% GDP    Start-ups   GDP    Firm Stock   GDP    Firm Stock    
Bavaria  138 (3)  5.2%     1.51    1.11    1.13    1.14    1.22    1.10   
North Rhine-Westphalia  193 (5)  3.7%     0.61  X 0.27  X 0.76    0.26  X  0.73    0.26  X 
Baden-Wuerttemberg  130 (2)  4.5%     1.10    1.74    1.32    1.57    1.27    1.55   
Hesse  174 (4)  15.4%     0.23  X 0.25  X 0.79    0.62  X  0.66  X  0.49  X 
Lower Saxony  220 (8)  17.4%     0.55  X 0.73    1.18    0.64  X  1.03    0.66  X 
Hamburg  17 (1)  0.0%     1.13    1.53    0.99    1.17    1.02    1.29   
Rhineland-Palatinate  195 (6)  8.3%     0.69    0.97    0.58  X 1.05    0.61  X  1.01   
Schleswig-Holstein  216 (7)  0.0%     0.46  X 1.99    0.77    2.92    0.70    2.58   












Saarland  301 (11)  0.0%     1.23    0.84    0.54  X 0.82    0.70    0.81   
Berlin  245 (9)  0.0%     3.48    1.54  0.64  X 0.59 X  1.30   1.28   
Thuringia 352  (14)  82.6%  X  1.72    2.54  2.97   1.52   2.68   1.84   
Saxony 344  (13)  65.5%  X  1.10    0.98  0.73   1.22   0.82   1.16   
Saxony-Anhalt 369  (15)  79.2%  X  1.96   1.98  1.24   2.03   1.41   2.11   












Brandenburg  330  (12)  66.7%  X  0.55 X 0.39 X 0.11 X 0.34  X 0.21 X  0.37  X 